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The paper considers a situation where two countries – the North and the South – use a 
non-traded polluting input to produce the goods for final consumption. The North is 
more efficient in both, production and abatement processes. The study compares the 
effects of the transfer of abatement technology by the North to the South under autarky 
with the free trade situation, assuming that the North pre-commits to an international 
protocol to keep the global pollution under a fixed level. The conditions under which 
either full or partial technology is transferred in autarky are determined. It is shown that 
under free trade no such transfer is possible. With trade even though the North wants a 
complete transfer of technology, the South refuses it. 
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In the run-up to the decisive rounds of negotiations concerning a post-Kyoto agreement, 
there is much dispute about the emission-target levels as well as about the adequate 
policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Concerning the latter, one main 
controversial subject is the integration of developing countries.  
The question regarding the emission targets is only blurredly indicated by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is the fundament for the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Convention stipulates in its Article 2 that the ultimate objective of 
this Convention is to achieve the stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.  
Concerning the adequate policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, the UNFCCC 
assigned the main responsibility for combating climate change to the North. A way 
considered for also involving developing countries into the international abatement 
efforts is the transfer of cleaner technologies from industrialized to developing countries. 
Technology transfer (see, e.g. Schelling (1992), IPCC (2007: 787)) as well as R&D see, 
e.g. Stern (2007)),
1  are regularly regarded as important strategies to combat global 
warming. Barrett (2006: 22) stresses that “R&D is especially needed to bring about 
substantial, long-term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases”. 
And Hoel and de Zeeuw (2008: 2) note that the international debate on climate protection 
agreements “circles to some extent around the question whether international treaties 
should focus on technology development rather than on emission reduction.” Benedick 
(2001) proposes a portfolio of elements for a post-Kyoto plan, which draws heavily on 
the diffusion of technology. The included elements are emission reduction policies, 
government research development, technology standards and technology transfer.  
                                                 
1 However, the evaluations of policies supporting R&D are not positive throughout, see, e.g. Popp (2006) 
as well as Fischer and Newell (2007).   
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The IPCC (2000) points to the fact that one salient feature of technology transfer related 
to global climate change is that of scale. “Essentially all countries of the world could be 
involved in the process, and the number of technologies could easily run into the 
thousands” (IPCC (2000)). Furthermore, the whole world is expected to be the 
beneficiary of technology transfer.   
Some strand of scientific literature addresses questions of how environmental policy 
influences the diffusion of improved technology. As Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002: 62) 
point out: “the long term nature of policy challenges such as that posed by the threat of 
global climate change makes it all the more important that we improve our understanding 
of the effects of environmental policy on innovation and diffusion of new technology.”   
The flexible clean development mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto scheme is seen as one 
important option to push the transfer of cleaner technologies. Haites, Duan and Seres 
(2006) note that although the CDM has no explicit technology transfer mandate, roughly 
one-third of all CDM-projects involve technology transfer. Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and 
Ménière (2008: 1275) even find that 43% of the 644 CDM projects they investigate are 
involving technology transfer and these projects are responsible for 84% of the expected 
annual CO2 emission reductions. However, the host countries are very heterogeneous in 
their capability to attract technology transfer (Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and Ménière 
(2008: 1277)). Furthermore, Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and Ménière (2008: 1283) 
discover that technology transfers are more likely in large projects and that the 
probability of technology transfer is 50% higher when the project is developed in a 
subsidiary of an Annex 1 company; having an official credit buyer in the project also 
exerts a positive effect on transfer likeliness. Aslam (2001) investigates the role that the 
CDM could play in enhancing the effectiveness of north-south technology transfer. 
Millock (2002), in turn, argues that technology transfer can improve incentives for cost-
effective emission reductions under bilateral CDM contracts when there is asymmetric 
information between the investor and the project-hosting party. Glachant and Ménière 
(2007) evaluate the ability of the CDM to yield the optimal diffusion path, when firms 
can adopt a cleaner technology simultaneously of sequentially. Since adaptation involves 
fixed cost endogenously decreasing with previous adaptation, inefficiencies are created  
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and these are not properly addressed by the CDM. Due to these inefficiencies, Glachant 
and Ménière propose design improvements.  
In this paper we will analyze technology transfers from industrialized countries towards 
the developing world in general equilibrium framework. We do not confine the analysis 
to a specific (technology) transfer scheme like the CDM, although the considered 
transfers could – in principle – be provided via CDM projects. We are interested in the 
role that international trade plays concerning the effects of technology transfer on global 
environmental protection. The role of trade in international technology transfer is a vivid 
field of research, as Saggi (2002) illustrates in his survey. However, our interest is 
focused on environmental protection technologies.  
More precisely, in our analysis we will investigate and answer the following two research 
questions: 1) What are the determinants of the extent of technology transfer from the 
industrialized to the developing world? 2) Can technology transfer serve as an effective 
instrument to stabilize the global greenhouse gas emission level at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, as claimed by the 
UNFCCC? 
We will investigate these two questions by explicitly regarding the influence of 
international trade on the outcomes. As Brewer (2008: 1) points out: “there are some 
intersections that are especially problematic in the threats to the international climate 
and/or trade regimes, while there are others that offer opportunities for win-win 
outcomes”. By our analysis we intend to contribute to answering the more general 
question, under which circumstances international trade is beneficial concerning climate 
protection. As the World Bank (2007: 8) stresses: “Interestingly, the trade-environment 
debate has so far considered little in terms of global-scale environmental problems – 
climate change, declining biodiversity, the depletion of ocean fisheries, and the 
overexploitation of shared resources.”     
Our framework developed to answer these questions takes account of two different 
scenarios: 1) the no-trade (“autarkic”) situation and 2) the setting where trade in two  
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commodities takes place.
2 Thus, the basic setting, i.e. the distinction between autarky and 
free trade, is similar to that employed by Alpay (2000) and Mukherjee and Rübbelke 
(2006) in their Ricardian models. However, Alpay (2000) does not explicitly consider 
technology transfer from industrialized to developing countries. Like we do, Mukherjee 
and Rübbelke (2006) investigate the technology transfer from rich to poor countries, but 
in contrast to their study we include an immobile polluting input factor into the analysis 
which can be traded in none of both scenarios (autarky and free trade).
3 This polluting 
input can be regarded to be “electric power”, whose production causes emissions of the 
greenhouse gas CO2. Greenhouse gas mitigation could take place on the supplier side, 
e.g. by enhancing supply efficiency or increasing the proportion of biofuels in the 
production. 
The technology transfer that we regard in our Ricardian model causes a mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions per production-output unit. Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) as 
well as Itoh and Tawada (2003) also employ a Ricardian approach to analyze technology 
transfer. Yet, Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) deal only with the transfer of production 
technologies and do not consider the change in the pollution level associated with the 
change in the production structure as an effect of trade. Therefore, in their framework, 
technology transfer from the North to the South is always beneficial. The study by Itoh 
and Tawada (2003) – which adopts the framework of Copeland and Taylor (1999) – 
investigating the technology-transfer issue and its interaction with pollution differs to 
ours due to differences in the assumptions about abatement commitments. Yang (1999) 
also considers the pollution mitigation effect of the technology transfer in the South, but 
ignores what Copeland and Taylor (2004, 2005) call the “scale effect”, i.e. the expansion 
of the polluting industry. In contrast to our approach, in their analysis of endogenous 
technical change Copeland and Taylor (2005) as well as Takarada (2005) do not employ 
                                                 
2 As Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2004: 1) point out: “Trade liberalization can affect the environment 
through several mechanisms, such as interjurisdictional competition to lower standards, transfer of 
pollution abatement technology, cross-border spillovers, or changes to the overall scale of economies.” 
They add that they consider the most direct effect of trade liberalization on the environment to be through 
the composition of industries. Reppelin-Hill (1999) provides an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between trade openness and the adoption/diffusion of clean technologies. Frankel and Rose (2005) 
investigate the effects of trade on local/regional air pollution (SO2, NO2, particulate matter). 
3 Jones and Marjit (2008) discuss how the feature that a country typically produces commodities which are 
non-tradeable in addtion to producing commodities for the world market, can be captured in trade models.    
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We suppose that - in line with Article 4 of the UNFCCC - the main obligation to combat 
climate change is assigned to the industrialized world and that - in line with the Kyoto 
Protocol - only the industrialized countries commit to pursue climate protection policies 
intending to stabilize the global climate. We allow for full as well as partly transfer of 




We assume that there are two countries, one is a developed country designated as North 
(N) and the other is an underdeveloped country designated as South (S). Each country 
produces two distinct private goods X1 and X2 which are used for final consumption. 
These goods are produced with the help of the primary input labour and an intermediate 
input X3. X3 is again produced by labour only. But the production of X3 causes pollution 
by emitting carbon dioxide (CO2). For simplicity, we assume that one unit of X3 
production emits one unit of CO2. Thus X3 is an impure public good as it has private good 
properties along with a public bad property by creating a negative externality all over the 
world. Suppose both the countries have the technology to abate pollution but the North 
has a better technology than the South. We assume that the i
th country abates the fraction 
ψ
i of the CO2 emissions per unit of X3 production using labour, where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈
i ψ . So the 
final emission of CO2 becomes φ
i = 1 - ψ
i
 per unit of X3 production. 
Both countries have identical labour endowments (L) along with full employment. From 
the full employment conditions we arrive at the following equations for the i
th country as:  
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i i i i i i i i i X a X a X a X a L 3 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 ψ + + + =           (1) 
and 
i i i i i X a X a X 2 32 1 31 3 + =   .             ( 2 )  
Here 
i
j a  is the labour coefficient for the j
th good in the i
th country. It represents the 
amount of labour required to produce one unit of the j
th good in the i
th country,  3 , 2 , 1 = ∀j  
and ∀ i = N, S. 
i a4 is the amount of labour required to abate the fraction ψ
i of one unit of 
CO2 in the i
th country. Now 
i
k a3  is the amount of X3 required as intermediate input to 
produce one unit of k
th good in the i
th country, ∀ k = 1, 2. 
By substituting the value of 
i X3 from equation (2) into the equation (1) we can derive the 
equation of the production possibility frontier (PPF) for the i
th country as: 
i i i i i i i i i i i i X a a a a X a a a a L 2 32 4 3 2 1 31 4 3 1 ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ψ ψ + + + + + =   .     (3)  
We assume that the North is more efficient in the production of X1, X2, and X3 and also in 
the abatement process than the South. So, all the labour coefficients of the North are less 
than the corresponding labour coefficients of the South. Furthermore, without loss of 
symmetry, we assume that in both countries the X1 sector has a higher share of 
intermediate input in the total primary input requirement than the X2 sector. This implies 
i i i i i
i
i i i i i
i
a a a a
a
a a a a
a
32 4 3 2
32
31 4 3 1
31
) ( ) ( ψ ψ + +
>
+ +





Next we assume that both countries have identical welfare functions. Note that each 
country receives a positive utility from consuming X1 and X2. Yet the consumption of 
these goods inflicts a negative external effect on the society. This is because consumption 
of these goods demands production of X3 which gives rise to global pollution. Thus in the 
process of consumption of X1 and X2, the society also has a disutility arising out of 
pollution. Accordingly we write the welfare function of the i
th country as:  
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) ( ) , ( 2 1 G v X X U U
i i − =            ( 4 )  
We consider  ) , ( 2 1
i i X X U  being a continuous, twice differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave function over the domain
i i X X 2 1, 0 ≥ . It also has the following properties: 
0 , 2 1 > U U  and  0 , 22 11 < U U  and 0 21 12 = =U U . In equation (4), G represents the global 
pollution level. Thus, it holds: 
S S N N X X G 3 3 φ φ + = .                ( 5 )  
Substituting the value of 
i X3 from equation (2) into equation (5) we get: 
) ( ) ( 2 32 1 31 2 32 1 31
S S S S S N N N N N X a X a X a X a G + + + = φ φ .      (6) 
We assume that the disutility function v(G) is a strictly increasing and convex function 
over the domain
i i X X 2 1, 0 ≥ , that is  0 ) (
/ > G v  and 0 ) (
// > G v . 
In the following section we analyse how both countries determine their consumption 
levels simultaneously by maximising their respective welfare function subject to their 




In the Cournot equilibrium the i
th country maximises its welfare function given in 
equation (4) subject to the equation of the PPF as given in equation (3). So the problem 
for the i
th country is written as:  
} , { 2 1
i i X X
Max ) ( ) , ( 2 1 G v X X U U
i i − =  
subject to 
i i i i i i i i i i i i X a a a a X a a a a L 2 32 4 3 2 1 31 4 3 1 ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ψ ψ + + + + + = , 
where  ) ( ) ( 2 32 1 31 2 32 1 31
S S S S S N N N N N X a X a X a X a G + + + = φ φ . 
We set up the Lagrange function for this constrained optimisation problem which 
becomes: 
























1 X ] a ) ψ a a ( a [ - X ] a ) ψ a a ( a [ - L + + + + ]  
           ( 7 )  
subject to  0 , , 2 1 > λ
i i X X . 
From equation (7) we get the following first-order conditions for the i
th country:  
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i i i i i a a a a ψ + +   =  0,      (8) 










] ) ( [ 32 4 3 2
























1 X ] a ) ψ a a ( a [ - X ] a ) ψ a a ( a [ L + + + + -  = 0.     (10) 
Since the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and the disutility function is strictly 
convex which is also quasi-concave, the entire welfare function is strictly quasi-concave. 
This implies that the second-order condition for this constrained maximisation problem is 
also satisfied. 
Solving equations (8) and (9), we get the optimum consumption levels of X1 and X2 for 
the  i
th country. Let the optimum consumption levels be 
i X1* and 
i X 2*, respectively. 
Substituting these values of 
i X1* and 
i X 2* into equation (2), we get the optimum 
production of the polluting good in the i
th country as * 3
i X . Thus the optimum pollution 
caused by the i
th country is * 3
i iX φ . Hence the optimum global pollution level becomes: 
* * 3 3
S S N N X X R φ φ + = .          ( 1 1 )  
In the following sections we consider the different situations of technology transfer by 
the North to the South for better abatement along with the willingness of the North to 
transfer the technology and the acceptance of the South. Then we compare these 




We consider next the situation where the North commits within the framework of an 
international protocol to transfer its – more efficient – abatement technology to the South, 
such that the global pollution level does not go beyond R  as given in equation (11), i.e. 
the optimum global pollution level before the transfer took place. We assume that the  
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abatement technology is divisible and for the extent θ of technology transfer from the 
North to the South it holds that: 
















θ = , this implies that the North does not offer any technology transfer to the 












then the North offers partial technology transfer to the South. Before the technology 
transfer takes place, the South could abate only ψ
S fraction of CO2 emitted per unit of X3 
production using 
S a4  units of labour. After receiving a better technology from the North it 
can abate an amount of θψ
N of CO2 emission per unit of X3 production using the same 
amount of labour. Due to the technology transfer the equation of the PPF of the South 
becomes: 
S S N S S S S S N S S S X a a a a X a a a a L 2 32 4 3 2 1 31 4 3 1 ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ θψ θψ + + + + + =        (13) 
Writing [
S N S S S a a a a 31 4 3 1 ) ( θψ + + ] as α
S and  ] ) ( [ 32 4 3 2
S N S S S a a a a θψ + +  as β
S we can rewrite 
equation (13) as: 
S S S S X X L 2 1 β α + =           ( 1 4 )  
Note that even after the technology transfer took place, the following holds true: 
S N S S S
S
S N S S S
S
a a a a
a
a a a a
a
32 4 3 2
32
31 4 3 1
31










32 31 >             ( 1 5 )  
Equation (15) implies that even after the technology transfer took place, the South still 
continues to have a higher share of intermediate input in total primary input in the X1 
sector than in the X2 sector. 
In a next step, we present the problem as one of sequential decision making. In the first 
stage, the North has to decide about its consumption levels of X1 and X2 and the extent of 
technology transfer, that is it has to choose 
N N X X 2 1 ,  and θ . In the second stage, the  
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South observes 
N N X X 2 1 ,  and θ  and chooses its consumption levels 
S X1  and
S X 2  such 
that the global pollution level G ≤ R . 
We solve this problem through backward induction method. The North first observes the 
reaction of the South to changes in its consumption of X1, X2  and  θ and later on 
incorporates the reaction functions to solve for the optimum values of X1, X2 and θ. In the 
following sections we solve this problem separately for autarky and free trade. 
 
II.5.1 Autarky Situation 
Here the North first maximises the welfare function of the South and then derives its 
reaction functions. Substituting i = S in equation (4) we write the welfare function of the 
South as: 
) ( ) , ( 2 1 G v X X U U
S S − =  
Note that the value of G is not the same as in equation (6). This is because after the 
technology transfer the South abates θψ
N amount of CO2 per unit of X3 production. So the 
emission of the South becomes (1 - θψ
N). Thus the value of G now becomes: 
) )( 1 ( ) ( 2 32 1 31 2 32 1 31
S S S S N N N N N N X a X a X a X a G + − + + = θψ φ .           (16) 
After substitution of the value of G from equation (16) into the welfare function of the 
South, the welfare maximization problem of the South can be written as: 
Max [ ) , ( 2 1 v X X U U
S S − = ) )( 1 ( ) ( 2 32 1 31 2 32 1 31
S S S S N N N N N N X a X a X a X a + − + + θψ φ ] 
subject to 
S S S S X X L 2 1 β α + = . 
Here the choice variables for the South are
S X1  and
S X 2  as
N X1 ,
N X 2  and θ are already 
determined in stage one. So the South takes
N X1 ,
N X 2  and θ  as given, while solving the 









= .           ( 1 7 )  
After substitution of the value of
S X 2  from equation (17) into the welfare function of the 
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+ − + + ].   (18) 
From equation (18) we get the following first-order condition for
S X1  > 0: 
0 ) 1 (
32 31



















     ( 1 9 )  































<  0.     (20) 
Since U11, U22 < 0 and v
// > 0, the expression in equation (20) is negative which implies 
that the second-order condition for the maximisation of the welfare of the South is 
satisfied. 
From equations (19) and (20) we get the following lemma: 
 






















Proof: Totally differentiating equation (19) and substituting  0 2 = = θ d dX
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α θψ φ . 
 
 












































































.       (21) 
Note that the denominator of equation (21) is negative (see second-order condition (20)). 
From equation (15), in turn, we observe that the numerator of equation (21) is positive. 
            
By totally differentiating equation (19) and substituting  0 1 = = θ d dX
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α θψ φ        (22) 
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The denominator of equation (23) is negative (see second-order condition (20)) and the 
numerator is positive (take account of equation (15)). 
By total differentiation of equation (19) and substituting  0 2 1 = =
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      (25) 
Note that the denominator of equation (25) is negative due to the second-order condition 
as given in equation (20). In the numerator the term within (.) is positive as is evident 
from equation (15) but nothing can be said definitely about the sign of the term within [.].  
The results of Lemma 1 can be explained intuitively. The North first chooses its output 
levels of X1 and X2 and also the extent of technology transfer.  
The South, which is not committed to meet any emission target, chooses its output levels 
without taking into consideration that – from the North’s point of view – the output levels 
should be such that the global pollution resulting from it does not go beyond the given 
limitR .   
However, if the North expands its production of any one good, then the South will reduce 
the production of X1
S, because the negative externality (risen global pollution) exerted by 
the higher consumption level in the North makes own consumption of the strongly 
polluting good X1 less attractive.  
Yet, if the North increases the extent of technology transfer, then the South could 
increase the production of X1 as well as of X2, because the abatement of emissions has 
become less labour intensive and hence there is more labour input available for producing 
X1 and X2. Yet, depending on the shape of the South’s welfare function, the production of 
X1 may rise, remain constant or decrease. If the production of X1 decreases, then it is 
obvious that the South will raise the production of X2, since we assumed that inputs will 
be fully employed.   
After incorporating the reaction functions of the South as given under Lemma 1, the 
North chooses its output levels and the level of technology transfer to maximise its  
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welfare function. However, while doing this it has to satisfy some constraints like the full 
employment of labour and also the commitment that it should transfer technology in such 
a way that the global pollution level does not exceed R . Also it must choose the extent 
of technology transfer that satisfies equation (12). Thus substituting i = N in equation (3) 
we write the equation of the North’s PPF as: 
N N N N N N N N N N N N X a a a a X a a a a L 2 32 4 3 2 1 31 4 3 1 ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ψ ψ + + + + + = .                                 (26) 
Let us denote  ] ) ( [ 31 4 3 1
N N N N N a a a a ψ + +  as α
N and ] ) ( [ 32 4 3 2
N N N N N a a a a ψ + +  as β
N, so that we 
can rewrite equation (26) as: 
N N N N X X L 2 1 β α + = .                                                                                                  (27) 









= .                                                                                                      (28) 
After writing i = N and substituting the value of
N X 2  from equation (28) and the value of 
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θ ≥  ,                                                                                                                    (31) 
1 ≤ θ .                                                                                                                          (32) 
We set up the Lagrange function for this maximisation problem as: 
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+  λ1 )}] ( ){ 1 ( ) ( [
1
32 1 31 2 32 1 31 S
S S
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.                                                                                                        (33) 
Maximising equation (33) with respect to  0 θ , X
N
1 >  we obtain the following first-order 
conditions: 
0 ) 1 ( ) (
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1 32 31
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                                                             (38) 
The first order conditions enumerated in equations (34) to (38) help us to put forward our 
first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If the North offers to transfer an abatement technology to the South such 
that the global pollution level remains within the given limit R , then (i) it offers a partial 


























































* , (ii) it always offers complete technology transfer i.e. 






























































. Moreover the South 
does not accept any technology transfer offer from the North if G =R  but if G <R  then 











fulfilled.   
 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is very simple. The North chooses partial technology 
transfer when G is less than R  because at given output levels of the South, a better 
abatement technology leads to increased abatement in the South which increases the gap 
between the current global pollution level and R . Then the North will take this 
advantage and will increase its production thereby increasing its welfare and taking the 
pollution level toR . Thus it leaves no scope at all for the South to increase its 




























. This is because if the responsiveness of the output in 
South to a change in the extent of technology transfer is very high, then a marginal 
change in the extent of technology transfer will increase abatement and in response will  
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push up the production in South by a large extent. This will also increase pollution and 
the gap between pollution level and R  closes. So the North cannot increase its 
production and enjoy higher welfare now as the pollution level can cross R . So in this 
situation it will take the decision of not transferring any abatement technology to the 




























, then North will offer complete 
technology transfer to the South if G <R . This is because here if North makes any 
technology transfer by marginal amount, then the output in the South will not change (if 
G =R ) or it will increase by a much smaller amount when G <R . So the North observes 
that if it transfers its entire abatement technology to the South, abatement will increase 
and global pollution will fall. There will be a gap between the pollution level andR  
which can be filled up by the North itself by increasing its production thereby increasing 
its welfare too.  
It is interesting to note that when G =R , although the North wants to make complete 
technology transfer to the South still the latter will never accept this offer from the former 
in this situation. This is because the South observes that it cannot increase its output even 
though the North transfers its abatement technology. So at given output levels there will 
be now more abatement which will make the global pollution constraint non-binding. 
This will allow the North to expand its production and increase the pollution level to 
make the pollution constraint binding. Thus the North gains from increase in 
consumption of goods. Yet, the South cannot gain as it cannot increase its production but 
on the contrary it will suffer a loss due to the increase in the global pollution level. But if 










. Note that 
2 U
v′
 indicates the ratio of marginal loss to South resulting from 
pollution to the marginal benefit arising out of consumption of X2. In this situation a 
transfer of technology will allow the South to increase its production of X1 and reduce the 
production of X2. So the marginal benefit from consumption of X2 increases due to the 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility. But increase of production of X1 increases the  
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 then the South will not 
accept the technology transfer by the North since the marginal benefit arising out from X2 
outweighs the loss arising from increase in pollution. So it will accept the offer of 
technology transfer only when the ratio of marginal loss to marginal benefit is at least as 





II.5.2 Free Trade Situation 
The countries now engage themselves in free trade. Since both the countries have 
identical labour endowments so the only basis for trade here is the difference in 
production technologies. Following Ricardian theory of Comparative Advantage, we 
assume that the North has a comparative advantage in the production of X2 and the South 
has a comparative advantage in the production of X1. This means that the labour cost of 
producing one unit of X2 relative to X1 is lower in North than in South (See Daerdorff, 
2005)
4. So from equation (3) we have: 
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. So we must have: 
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p = . Therefore equation (47) is written as: 
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According to the Ricardian theory after trade a country completely specialises in the 
production of that commodity in which it has a comparative advantage. This implies that 
after trade North produces only X2 and the South produces only X1.  
                                                 
4 Assume that the price of the intermediate input i.e. X3 is unity.  
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So putting i = N and X1 = 0 in equation (3) we get the production of X2 in North as: 
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=                                                                                  (49) 
Similarly putting i = S and X2 = 0 in equation (3) we get the production of X1 in South as: 
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 denote the consumption of X1 and X2 respectively after trade in the ith 
country, ∀ i = N, S.  
So the budget constraint for the North becomes: 
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Similarly the budget constraint of the South is written as: 
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Since X1 is produced in the South only so the consumption of X1 by the North and the 
South must equal the total X1 production in the world. Thus we get the world market 
equilibrium condition for X1 as: 
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Similarly we get a world market equilibrium condition for X2 as: 
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Thus after trade the level of pollution in the world becomes: 
R =
S S S N N N X a X a 1 31 2 32 φ φ +                                                                                           (55) 
The equation (55) leads to Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2: R R >  
 
Proof: The Ricardian theory of trade highlights the beneficial role of free trade over 
autarky in gains from trade by proposing that the world production and consumption of 
goods rises after trade as trade leads to an efficient allocation of resources. So the  
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production of X1 and X2 in the world increases after trade. This leads to an increased 
production of the polluting intermediate input X3 in the world. So the global pollution 
level after trade definitely exceeds the same before trade. 
The result of Lemma 1 increases the urgency of the abatement technology transfer to 
keep the global pollution level at R . So let θ  be the extent of abatement technology that 
the North can transfer to the South. Here also the choice of θ is subject to the constraint 
as given in equation (12). 
Thus after technology transfer the level of pollution in the world becomes: 
S S N N N N X a X a R 1 31 2 32 ) 1 ( θψ φ − + =                                                                              
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From equation (53) we get the following lemma: 




Proof: Now differentiating both sides of equation (53) with respect to θ we get: 
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 is negative by the Walrasian stability 




The result of Lemma 3 can be intuitively explained. When the North transfers technology 
to the South then the abatement increases in the South and it becomes more efficient in 
the production of X1. As a result the production of X1 increases and the price of it falls in 
the world market. In other words, the relative price of X2 increases. 
The welfare function of the North leads to the second proposition:  
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Proposition 2: Under free trade the North will always offer full abatement technology to 
the South as the global pollution level is higher than the level specified in the protocol. 
On the other hand the South will never accept this technology transfer from the North.    
Proof: From equation (4) we get the welfare function of the North under free trade after 
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From equation (51) we can write 
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substituting it into equation (58) we have: 
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Maximising equation (59) with respect to 
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, i.e. the marginal benefit that accrues to the North after 
transferring technology to the South is positive. Hence, the North will transfer its entire 
abatement technology to the South.      
Rewriting equation (4) putting i = S the welfare function of the South is obtained as 
follows: 
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 Modifying equation (52) after incorporating the technological parameter θ we get:  
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Now South will maximise its welfare function as given in equation (62) using equation 
(63) as the constraint. From equation (63) we can write 
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 Maximising equation (64) with respect to 
S X 2
~
 and θ we get the following first order 
conditions: 
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Using the first order condition given in equation (65) we can rewrite equation (66) as: 
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, i.e. the marginal benefit that accrues to the 
South after receiving technology from the North is negative. Hence, the South will never 
accept any abatement technology from the North.                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                              
The intuition behind this proposition is very clear. The results of Lemma 3 point out that 
if there is a marginal technology transfer from the North to the South then it will raise the 
relative price of X2 to X1 in the international market. Since North is the exporter of X2 so 
it gains from this technology transfer as it shifts the terms of trade in its favour. Due to 
this favourable ‘terms of trade’ effect the North will always be inclined to transfer its full 
abatement technology to the South. But as the terms of trade goes against the South so it 
has nothing to gain from this technology transfer. Hence it will not accept the offer of the 




Global warming is one of the major threats to our planet. Combat of climate change 
cannot be effectively conducted by individual countries alone, but requires global efforts. 
However, developing countries are reluctant to commit to climate protection efforts or 
greenhouse gas abatement in an international protocol. This is due to the fact that these 
countries currently face also other and more immediate threats like hunger and diseases. 
Furthermore, they point to the fact that global warming is mainly caused by greenhouse 
gas emissions stemming from industrialized countries and therefore, it is mainly these 
countries’ responsibility to combat this threat. 
One way to include developing countries in international climate protection efforts 
nevertheless, is to offer transfers to these countries. In our study we focused on transfers 
in the shape of (more efficient abatement) technology. Our aim was to analyze the 
interdependencies between technology transfer, climate protection and trade.     
We employed a framework where two regions, viz. the North and the South, are 
producing two commodities which demand the use of a polluting input apart from the 
primary input labour. The North, which basically resembles the features of industrialized 
countries, is efficient in the production of the goods and as well as in the abatement of the 
pollution associated with the production process. There is a global body (international 
protocol) which regulates the global pollution level by fixing up an upper limit. The 
North has committed to keep the global pollution level under control. In order to meet the 
emission target, it faces two options: 1.) reducing own emissions and 2.) transferring 
efficient abatement technology (either partially or in fully) in the polluting non-traded 
sector (like energy production) to the South. The South has been assumed to have 
comparative advantage in production of the commodity that intensively uses the non-
traded commodity.    
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Regarding two different situations, i.e. the autarky case and the free trade case, we 
analyze the choice of the North and the induced consequences. The distinction between 
both settings is employed in order to disclose the impacts of rising trade openness.  
 
In the autarky case we see that the North may transfer either complete or partial 
technology or it may even stay away from making any transfer. Even though the 
technology is transferred free of cost, the South may not always benefit.  
In contrast, under free trade and complete specialisation although the North always has 
incentive to offer complete transfer of its technology to the South, the South has no 
incentive to accept it. Consequently, our analysis provides the new insight that free trade 
leads to coordination failure between the countries concerning the efficient technology 
use and ends up in a suboptimal global equilibrium. The world will finally face a 
pollution level that is higher than the limit specified by the international protocol.  
Thus, we can draw the conclusion that globalisation or increased trade openness tends to 
weaken the role technology transfer could play in raising global climate protection levels. 
However, we have to note that our analysis is based on some restrictive assumptions. 
Relaxation of these might lead to variances in the results. The modification of the 
assumptions about the commodity-pollution structures in the individual countries’ 
production processes could change the results according to the effects of trade openness. 
Furthermore, the assumptions of complete specialisation and costless technology 
transfers belong to the limiting parts of the paper. Future research could address these 
limitations, e.g. by comparing the effects of abatement technology transfer with those of a 
‘mix’ of abatement and production technology transfer.  
 





Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
Case I 
Due to equations (36), (37) and (38), let us assume that λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0. This implies at 





, that is the North chooses partial technology transfer 
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ε = . It measures the responsiveness in the output of X1 in the 
South due to a change in the extent of technology transfer by the North. 



































1 ) 1 (
                                                                  (40) 



























































In other words, north transfers partial technology when the pollution constraint is strictly 
binding. 





Z S N X v 3 1) ( ψ λ + ′ .                                                                                              (41)  
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Note that from Lemma 1 we already have 
θ ∂
∂
S X1  = 0 when G =R . So from equation (41) 





. In this situation the North will always choose complete technology 
transfer, that is θ = 1. Yet, we have partial technology transfer by assumption. Hence this 
case is inconsistent. 
Case III: Let us assume that λ1 = λ2 = 0 and λ3 > 0. This means at equilibrium G < R  





, so North does not transfer any technology to the South when the global 
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, which implies that when the pollution constraint is binding the North does 
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S N X v . Using Lemma 1 we have 
θ ∂
∂
S X1  = 0, when G =R . Here we 





. In this situation the North will always choose complete 
technology transfer, that is θ = 1. However, we already have no technology transfer at 
equilibrium by assumption. So this case is inconsistent and we cannot have this type of 
equilibrium.  
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Case V:  Let us now consider that λ1 = 0, λ2  > 0 and λ3 =  0. This means now at 





 such that North chooses complete 
technology transfer when the pollution level is below the limit as specified in the 
protocol.  
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Case VI: Let us suppose that λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 and λ3 = 0.  So at equilibrium we have G =R  





, that is the North transfers complete technology when the pollution 
constraint is fully binding. So from equation (35) we get the following condition:  
2 3 1) ( λ ψ λ − + ′
S N X v = 0                                                                                            (42) 
Now from equation (42) we observe that the signs of the given parameters can satisfy this 
equation. Hence this case is consistent and can be classified as an equilibrium outcome.  
From equation (18) we obtain the following welfare function of the South: 
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By using the first-order condition of the South given in equation (19) as well as equation 
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If G < R , then  0 ≥
θ d
dU










. Yet, if G =R , then v ′ = 0 which 
implies  0 <
θ d
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